Achieving a ‘sustainable’ industrial base-why do two small open economies perform differently? The cases of Ireland and Sweden by Lenihan, Helena
 1 
Regional Studies Association Annual International Conference, ‘Regional Responses and 
Global Shifts: Actors, Institutions and Organisations’, Pecs, Hungary, 24-26 May 2010. 
 
 
Achieving a ‘sustainable’ industrial base-why do two small open 
economies perform differently? the cases of Ireland and Sweden 
 
Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Helena Lenihan1 
Department of Economics 
Kemmy Business School 
University of Limerick. 
E-mail: Helena.Lenihan@ul.ie 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
With high profile Multinational Enterprise (MNE) job losses being a regular news 
feature in Ireland of late, beginning largely with the first big announcement of the 
transfer of the production facility of Dell in Limerick to Lodz in Poland in January 
2009, MNE job losses have become an almost daily occurrence.   The latter has 
contributed significantly to the ever increasing unemployment rate in Ireland currently 
standing at 12.6 per cent (CSO February 2010 Live Register).  Developments such as 
the above have put into question the sustainability of an Irish industrial strategy which 
has placed most of its industrial development efforts into the FDI/MNE basket.  It 
could reasonably be questioned whether such a strategy has led to the neglect of an 
indigenous (largely SME) sector.  One of the key objectives of any industrial 
economic development strategy should be that the resulting economic activity and 
growth is sustainable, and that the industrial activity within the economy has some 
ability to cushion itself from asymmetric shocks such as the current global economic 
recession.   
 
In light of the above, the current paper seeks to analyse the issue of whether a strong 
indigenous industrial base is indeed a necessary condition for sustainable economic 
growth.  We are interested in exploring this issue in a number of ways: on a more 
general level, we approach and investigate this research question via the experience of 
two countries (Ireland and Sweden) comparable largely on the basis of their size and 
openness. Secondly, we look at whether there are lessons for Ireland from the 
industrial development experience and trajectory of the Swedish economy.  The latter 
is an interesting angle given that of late other countries (most especially those of the 
new member or accession states) have looked to the Irish experience in terms of 
whether they can learn industrial policy/development lessons.   Up to recently, many 
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have held Ireland up as a role model for industrial development [e.g. Sapir et al 2003; 
Sapir 2005, 2006; and Acs et al. 2007] while others writing along these lines have 
taken a more nuanced view (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan 2006; Bailey et al. 
2009).  The approach we take here is radically different given that we look at another 
country (namely Sweden) which is broadly comparable in terms of size and openness 
to assess the Irish industrial development strategy to date and to garner if lessons can 
be learned in terms of a future strategy.  What makes this interesting is that the 
economy of Sweden seems to have been to a lesser degree than Ireland impacted upon 
(in negative terms) by the recent economic downturn. We explore why there is such a 
degree of asymmetry emanating from the shock.  Is it due to the fact that Sweden has 
placed more emphasis on having a balanced/more diversified industrial sector vis-à-
vis for example, firm ownership (i.e. whether indigenous or foreign); size; sectors?   
In an attempt to address these issues, we examine growth impact at the level of the 
firm in terms of a number of indicators such as employment; competitiveness; GDP; 
productivity and innovation, disaggregated by firm ownership and ask whether the 
impact of the asymmetric shock of the global economic downturn can in some ways 
be attributed to the industrial diversification of the economies.   In particular, we 
explore the issue of whether economies less reliant on MNE activity and/or coupled 
with a more thriving indigenous base are less vulnerable and therefore less exposed to 
the intensity of external shocks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 introduces some of the 
key conceptual issues and theoretical underpinnings of this paper by first of all 
addressing how we define the term sustainable economic growth in terms of industrial 
economic activity.  In Section 1, we also discuss the concept of asymmetric shock. In 
terms of setting the scene, Section 2 depicts briefly the impact of the shock on Ireland 
and Sweden in terms of growth rates, exports and employment.  Section 3 proceeds by 
outlining the development of Irish industrial activity and associated industrial policies 
so as to shed some light on the engine of structural change. For comparative purposes 
and also in terms of lessons for Ireland, Section 3, provides some brief insights into 
the industrial development trajectory in Sweden.  Section 4 attempts to answer the key 
research question by analysing whether the nationality of firms could be used as an 
explanatory factor in the differential of intensities generated by the shock within the 
two economies. Although the analysis here is somewhat hampered by the 
unavailability of data disaggregated by firm ownership (particularly in the case of 
Sweden), some key insights still emerge.   Section 5 concludes the analysis.  
 
 
Section 1: Sustainable economic growth and asymmetric shocks  
1.1. Definitional issues 
 
During the recent decades of high economic growth (i.e. between the mid-1980s and 
mid-2008), the concept of ‘sustainable economic growth’ was overshadowed by that 
of short term economic growth, if by sustainable economic growth we mean positive 
and relatively high growth rates that can be sustained over a long period of time. A 
number of external shocks have characterised this period of time (namely the collapse 
of the Berlin wall, the Asian economic crisis and the dot.com crash), but Western 
economies were able to rebound relatively quickly. A major shock, such as the current 
banking crisis which erodes progressively the world real economy, brings to the fore 
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the idea of ‘economic vulnerability’ (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2007 and Andreosso-
O’Callaghan and Bassino, 2008). The same external shock can have a different impact 
on two economies, depending on their relative level of ‘vulnerability’. External 
shocks (and therefore economic vulnerability) can be minimised with increased 
independence, or sovereignty. 
Economic dependence, as defined by Tiano (1982), is a situation whereby a country 
lacks the essential in terms of economic policy making, technology and finance, and 
financial dependence arises when a country has a demand for financial capital which 
exceeds its domestic supply of financial assets leading to a growing national debt. In 
turn, dependence implies diminishing (economic) sovereignty.2 
1.2. Evolving views on economic sovereignty 
Finding its roots in the work of Jean Bodin (1676), the concept of sovereignty (and of 
economic sovereignty) is being revived periodically; its intensity tends to abate in 
times of prosperity, without totally vanishing. The concept was again in vogue in the 
1970s. This was the result of the oil shock, playing at the time the role of an external 
shock. The too high level of EC countries’ dependency (France for example) vis-à-vis 
energy suppliers, and the potential economic vulnerability of these countries, led to 
the development of a nuclear programme in France, where the energy dependency 
rate fell from 75 per cent to 50 per cent over the past few decades. At the turn of the 
new millennium, what could be perceived as ‘excessive globalisation’ or ‘bad 
globalisation’ led the French Parliament to debate on the vulnerability of French firms 
given their excessive dependency on foreign, mostly non-EU, sub-suppliers through 
the externalisation of many activities, and given the risk of increasing dependency of 
the French financial system on the US system (Assemblée Nationale, 2003). 
 
1.3. Implications for this research  
 
The fact that post WWII globalisation has involved nearly every nation of the world 
and has been encroaching on most aspects of economic activity, including financial 
services, brings with it the risk of decreased economic sovereignty. However, 
globalisation and diminished economic sovereignty should not be seen as 
synonymous; this implies that there is an optimal level of diminishing sovereignty 
(globalisation) (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). In light of what is happening today, this 
optimal level seems to have been well exceeded.  
Looking at the case of specific EU countries, can one argue that the ‘more sovereign’ 
economies, or those that have not departed too far away from an optimal level of 
diminished sovereignty, are also relatively less affected by the current economic 
crisis? Are they more likely to benefit from sustainable economic growth? We define 
economic sovereignty on the basis of the relative importance of indigenous firms in 
the manufacturing sector (and in particular those manufacturing firms engaged in 
higher value-added activities i.e. high up the value chain).   
 
 
Section 2: An analysis of the impact of the shock  
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2.1. Impact analysis   
(i) Macroeconomic indicators 
Table 1 below depicts some forecasts relating to a number of macroeconomic 
indicators before and since the crisis. 
 
Table 1: Selected Indicators (Annual percentage change and percent, 
respectively) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Ireland 
     
(1) Real GDP (annual per cent change) 5.7 6.0 -2.3 -8.0 -3.0 
(2) Current account (per cent of GDP) -3.6 -5.4 -4.5 -2.7 -1.8 
(3) CPI (annual per cent change) 2.7 2.7 3.1 -0.6 1.0 
(4) ECB marginal lending rate (%) 4.5 5.0 3.0 1.7 na 
(5) Interest rate, 10-year government bonds (%) 3.9 4.5 4.6 5.8 na 
(6) General government debt (% of GDP) 24.7 25.1 44.2 59.9 75.0 
      
Sweden 
     
(7) Real GDP (annual per cent change) 4.2 2.6 -0.2 -4.3 0.2 
(8) Current account (per cent of GDP) 8.6 8.6 8.3 6.9 7.4 
(9) CPI (annual per cent change) 1.5 1.7 3.3 -0.2 0.0 
(10) Repo rate (%) 3.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
(11) Interest rate, 10-year government bonds (%) 3.6 4.3 3.0 3.3 3.9 
(12) General government debt (% of GDP)  51.0 45.9 40.5 38.0 43.4 
Sources: (1), (2), (3), (7), (8), (9) IMF, World Economic Outlook, World Economic and Financial 
Surveys, April 2009; (4), (5), Central Statistics Office, Financial interest rate; (6) Budgetary and 
Economic Statistics, Department of Finance, September 2008; (10), (11), (12) Statistics Sweden and 
NIER, 19th December 2008. 
 
According to Table 1, the current shock has a more intense and lasting effect in 
Ireland than in Sweden. In Ireland, the decline in economic growth for 2009 is nearly 
twice that of Sweden, and whereas some growth is expected to resume in Sweden in 
2010, this is not the case for the Irish economy.  Of specific note is the size of the 
current account deficit in the case of Ireland, a situation which is in sharp contrast 
with a continuous surplus in Sweden.  
Faced with negative growth prospects for 2009, the two countries have nevertheless 
brought radically opposed measures to the crisis. An immediate response to the crisis 
by the Swedish authorities has been an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, with 
the announcement in December 2008 of a stimulus package (of €2.2bn over 3 years) 
and a low interest rate.3 This explains in part why GDP is expected to recover in 2010 
and deflation in 2009 should be followed by price stability in 2010. A specific 
problem to Swedish banks is nevertheless their relatively high exposure to over-
leveraged East European countries, in particular to the Baltic region (with real growth 
in Estonia and Lithuania having declined by more than 13 per in 2009, according to 
EUROSTAT figures).  
By contrast, the severe collapse in property related taxes in Ireland has led to an 
increasing budget deficit; as a result, a restrictive budgetary policy has been 
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implemented so as to lessen the impact on the government debt, which is estimated at 
three-quarters of GDP by 2010 (Table 1).  
 
(ii) Exports 
By virtue of their small size, both economies are highly dependent on exports. 
Swedish exports represent some 50 per cent of the country’s GDP, making the 
Swedish economy dependent on the buoyancy of the world market in general and of 
the EU market in particular, since the latter absorbs almost two-thirds of its exports. 
According to recent figures, Swedish exports of manufactured products declined in 
2009 by over 10 per cent compared with the previous year.4 This decline affects 
primarily the manufacturing sector, which is the source of more than 70 per cent of all 
Swedish exports, and a number of manufacturing industries therein. The engineering 
sector (encompassing Machinery Equipment, Office Machinery, Electrical 
Machinery, Optical Instruments, Motor Vehicles and Other Transport) represents 
nearly 42 per cent of total Swedish manufacturing exports. This compares with nearly 
36 per cent of all manufacturing exports in the case of Ireland. Chemical exports 
dominate in the case of Ireland, representing 30 per cent of the total in 2006. This 
share in total Irish manufacturing exports is more than twice that of Chemicals in total 
manufacturing exports from Sweden.  
These preliminary figures imply that the export structure of both countries typifies 
countries that have specialised in technology based industries.  
 
(iii) Unemployment  
Between December 2008 and December 2009, the numbers of unemployed persons 
increased steadily in Sweden, resulting in an unemployment rate of 9 per cent in 
December 2009 (Figure 1a).  The Swedish National Institute for Economic Research 
(NIER) forecasts that the unemployment rate could rise to 11.5 per cent in 2010 and 
to nearly 12 per cent by 2011.  
 
 
Figure 1a - Unemployment in Sweden (monthly 2005-2009; Per cent of the labour 
force unemployed) 
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Source: EUROSTAT, Unemployment Labour Force Survey,(une_rt_m), Luxembourge. 
 
Figure 1.b - Unemployment in Ireland (monthly 2005-2009; Per cent of the labour force 
unemployed) 
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Source: Central Statistics Office Ireland (Statistical Product-Live Register). 
 
Figure 1.b. portrays the sudden increase in unemployment in the case of Ireland. As 
can be seen, the unemployment rate gravitated around 4 to 5 per cent between 2005 
and 2007. The year 2008 will be rememebered as the year of a steady increase in the 
rate of unemployment in the country. As of December 2009, the rate of 
unemployment surpassed the 12.5 per cent mark. Although the unemployment rates 
are today broadly comparable between the two countries, a contrasting picture 
emerges from this descriptive analysis. First, the increase in the number of job losses, 
since the beginning of the current economic crisis, is much higher in the case of the 
Irish economy than in Sweden. Between 2006 and 2009, the unemployment rate  
increased by a third in the case of Sweden (from about 7, to 9%) whereas in Ireland 
the increase corresponded nearly to a trebling of the rate (from 4.4 to 12.5%). Judging 
by this indicator alone, the crisis seems be an asymmetric shock, since it hit Ireland 
much harder than a comparable economy in the EU. 
Second, the drop in employment in Sweden took place primarily within the 
manufacturing industry (see 4.2. below), whereas in Ireland, the construction sector 
has been playing an important role in explaining the rise of unemployment. Figures 
released by the Swedish Statistical Office show that some 48 per cent of the job losses 
during the year 2008 are attributable to a contraction in the manufacturing sector, as 
opposed to 14 per cent only in the building and construction sector. In Ireland, the 
construction sector was responsible for about 30 per cent of all job losses in the same 
year, whereas the manufacturing sector and the wholesale and retail trade industry 
represented another 24.8 per cent and 19 per cent of the overall decline, respectively5. 
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Employment lost in these areas was partly offset by an increase in employment in 
other services and agriculture. During 2009, although most of the job losses in Ireland 
were still in building and construction (-24.4 per cent), the gap with the 
manufacturing sector narrowed (-22.7 per cent), whereas greater knock on effects 
were felt in all services (except for banking, finance and insurance).  
It should be noted that by 2008, the construction sector represented in Ireland 11.4 per 
cent of the total labour force; this compares with 6.2 per cent in the case of Sweden, 
for the same year. A relatively large building sector is a characteristic of fast growing 
economies, whereas at a more mature stage of development, economies tend to rely 
more heavily on manufacturing and services. Given the transitory nature of the 
building sector and the derived nature of job creation in many services (with, in 
particular, buoyancy from building and manufacturing fuelling demand for real estate 
services, wholesale and retail trade, as well as catering services), the manufacturing 
sector seems therefore to assume a stable role in economic growth. This is close to the 
‘equipment hypothesis’ according to which there is a strong causal relationship 
between investment in manufacturing equipment and economic growth (De Long and 
Summers, 1991). 
Third, although in any economy job losses and closures are a typical casualty 
resulting from the severity of the crisis, the increase in unemployment in the 
manufacturing sector of Sweden is linked with the relatively important export 
propensity of Swedish firms (be they indigenous or foreign), whereas in Ireland job 
losses in manufacturing are for a large part to be explained by the withdrawal of 
footloose mostly US-owned MNEs. As reported in the literature, MNEs in Ireland 
tend to be characterised by a higher export intensity than indigenous firms, across all 
industries (Ruane and Ugur, 2006). This suggests that the expected increase in 
Swedish exports in 2010 is likely to stabilise (and indeed reverse) the unemployment 
rate in that country, whereas the misfortunes of the US economy seem to increasingly 
affect employment in Ireland. Nevertheless, one element that prevents the 
unemployment rate to rise to 1980s levels in Ireland is emigration (outflow of 
immigrants combined with Irish emigration to Australia, a country lifted out of the 
crisis by a certain recovery in neighbouring Asia). 
2.2. Explaining the severity of the shock 
A number of indicators, measuring the macroeconomic performance of an economy, 
can be used to explain the ability of an economy to withstand external competitive 
and other adverse pressures. Cost based indicators are among the most popular 
indicators. A usual way to compare the performance of a number of economies is to 
refer to competitiveness, a concept which is understood here in its most narrow sense, 
i.e. price (or cost) competitiveness. The striking message emanating from figure 2, is 
that Sweden, a rather (price) uncompetitive country in the early period, has managed 
to become more price competitive – during the years of the economic boom in 
Ireland. In contrast, Ireland has clearly lost its attractiveness over time in terms of 
being a price competitive country, although there was a downward trend during the 
1990s. The first decade of the new millennium is one characterised by a clear loss of 
(price) competitiveness for Ireland. 
 
Figure 2:  Competitiveness indicator (relative consumer prices, CPI), overall 
weights, 1970-2009 (2005 = 100) 
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Source: OECD database, Economic Outlook No 86: Annual and Quarterly data. 
 
 
Figure 3. Corporate income tax rate, 1981-2009 (%) 
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Source: OECD Tax Database, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Taxation of Corporate and 
Capital Income, table II.1. 
NB: For Ireland, the table shows only the higher rate of taxation for the earlier period. Between 1994 
and 2003, this higher rate was gradually reduced from 40% to the now single rate of 12.5% applying to 
all business corporations.  
 
Figure 3 shows the corporate tax rate for the two economies over the period 1981-
2009.  In the case of Ireland, we see that the corporate tax rate has decreased steadily 
since 1988 with a particularly sharp decrease since 1994.  In the case of Sweden, the 
corporate tax rate has tended to reduce over time with a current rate of 28 per cent 
which has prevailed since 1994. Overall, we can say that both economies have 
reduced their corporate tax rates over the period 1989-1998, in line with the aim of tax 
harmonisation within the EU. Ireland however, possesses a significant advantage 
having the significantly lower corporation tax from 2003 onwards at a rate of 12.5 per 
cent.   
 
Figure 4: Unit Labour Costs*, 1970-2008 
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Source: OECD.StatExtracts, Unit Labour Costs-Annual Indicators, Paris. 
*Index OECD base year 2005=100. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4 in both Ireland and Sweden, there has been an increase 
in the unit labour cost throughout the period 1970-2008.  The unit labour cost in the 
case of Ireland has increased from 10.59 in 1970 to 106.43 in 2007.  Over the same 
period, the index for Sweden increased from 15.85  to 103.82 respectively.  Overall 
and looking at the analysis between two economies, we see that over the period 1970-
1980, the unit labour cost is highest in Sweden. During the period 1980-1988, the unit 
labour costs in Ireland start increasing and were higher than those of Sweden, whereas 
during the latter period (1989-2005), the unit labour cost is higher in Sweden.   
 
Figure 5: Consumer Price Index of Energy*, 1970-2009 
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Source: OECD, IEA Energy Prices and Taxes. 
Base period 2005 = 100. 
 
Another important cost for firms is the cost of energy. Figure 5 shows the consumer 
price index of energy in the two economies; in the case of Ireland, the consumer price 
index of energy increases smoothly over time from 18.0 in 1976 to 113.4 in 2009.  In 
the case of Sweden, the consumer price index of energy increases from 11.6 in 1976 
to 116.8 in 2009. The consumer price index for energy is highest in Ireland over the 
period 1978-1992.  From 1993 to 2002, the situation is very similar between two 
economies.  However from 2002 onwards Sweden has higher CPI of energy than 
Ireland.   
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Across three of the four competitiveness indicators (CPI, unit labour costs and 
energy) Sweden does not perform better than Ireland. As a consequence, there must 
be other reasons that explain the better macroeconomic performance of Sweden since 
the beginning of the current crisis. Is it because manufacturing firms in Sweden are 
less exposed to the impact of the shock than those in Ireland? It is to these other 
possible reasons including structural change; industrial/enterprise policy (section 3) 
and the firm nationality issue-whether a firm is indigenous or foreign owned (section 
4) that we now turn.    
 
Section 3: Structural change (1970-2007) and industrial development 
activity and policy 
 
3.1. Industrial development activity and policy in Ireland  
 
In light of the focus of the current paper on indigenous/foreign firm mix, below we 
examine how this mix has manifested itself in the various industrial/enterprise 
development strategies and policies in Ireland over the decades.  
 
We begin by looking at structural change in Ireland over the period 1970-2007 and 
then proceed to trace the key developments in Irish industrial/enterprise development 
activity and policy.  Figure 6 provides a quick overview of structural change in 
Ireland over the period 1970-2007. A quick look demonstrates that agricultural 
activity has continued to decline from a peak in the 1970s.  As expected of a more 
advanced and prosperous  economy,  in the late 1990s and early 2000s, gross output 
in services continued to demonstrate an upward trend reaching a peak around 2007.  
The case of manufacturing is interesting given that it had been on a more or less a 
steady upward trend since the 1970s (with brief declines in 1991, 1993 and 1996).  A 
peak in manufacturing occurred in 1999 but has been on a steady decline thereafter. 
Services showed a strong upward trend since 1999.  
 
Figure 6. Gross output at current Irish prices over the period 1970-2007 (per 
cent of total gross output of economy) 
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Source: EU KLEMS Database, Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research and the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
Period: 1950-1970 
Beginning with the Economic Development Plan (1958), Irish policymakers focussed 
their attention on the promotion and attraction of Foreign Direct Investment.  The 
following quote sums up the views of the day very well:  
 
“We can no longer rely for industrial development on extensive tariff and 
quota protection. Foreign industrialists will bring skills and techniques we 
need, and continuous and widespread publicity abroad is essential to attract 
them. If foreign industrial development does not rapidly increase, a more 
radical removal of statutory restrictions on such investment should take 
place”. (Economic Development Plan, 1958:218). 
 
Ireland’s economic policy changed in the 1960s from a strategy based on inward 
looking protectionism to one of external openness, which targeted FDI as the engine 
of industrial development.  This strategy was basically one of ‘industrialisation by 
invitation’. As outlined by Begley et al., (2005), in the 1960s, an initial wave of 
predominately US owned companies set up operations in Ireland.  One of the key 
incentives during this period was Ireland’s zero per cent tax on profits generated 
through exports (up to Ireland’s entry into the Common Market, a rate that was then 
changed into the 10% corporate tax rate for export-oriented firms) in addition to 
generous capital grants. In most cases, those companies that came to Ireland were 
already well established, mature industries who simply transferred their 
manufacturing and assembly line activities of their operations to Ireland.  The type of 
products which were assembled in Ireland included textile, electrical goods and 
electrical and mechanical components.  There were very little supply chain linkages 
between these predominately US companies and other local indigenous companies.    
 
 
Period: 1970-1980 
 
From 1973 6  onwards, the Irish government under the auspices of the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) focussed on a strategy of attracting FDI in sectors such 
as electronics, chemicals and other ‘high-technology’ industries.  The 1970s brought 
new firms in new sectors, notable amongst these were Pfizer inc in the pharmaceutical 
and chemicals sector.  Computer industries were also attracted to Ireland, notable in 
this regards was Wang.  However, the types of activities that these computer 
industries tended to engage in were low-value assembly, typically components 
(Begley et al., 2005).   
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More specifically, looking at data 7  on the number of persons engaged in 
manufacturing in Ireland over the period 1970-1980, we observe that the vast majority 
of those employed in manufacturing in Ireland (approx. 23%) were employed in the 
food and beverages industry (NACE DA). A significant number of persons (approx. 
16%) were also engaged in Electrical and optical equipment industries (NACE DL).  
The situation is broadly the same for the following decade (1980-1990).   
 
Period: 1980-1990 
In the 1980s, basic MNE software activity was also attracted to Ireland.  At the time, 
Ireland was a most favourable location for investment given its well educated Irish 
workforce who were willing to work hard for low wages due to the high 
unemployment rates that prevailed during the 1980s until the beginning of the 1990s8.  
Other MNE companies choosing to locate in Ireland over this period included 
additional pharmaceutical companies and other sectors also began to set up processing 
and manufacturing activities in Ireland.  The 1980s also witnessed an industrial 
strategy of creating sectoral and spatial clusters.  Such attempts to build clusters were 
focussed around two prime technology sectors: electronics (in particular, 
microprocessors, software, computer products and printers) and 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals. Broadly speaking, while the empirical evidence on the 
impact of industrial clusters in Ireland is indeed limited, what existing evidence 
suggests that there has been little sectoral clustering between MNEs and local firms at 
least in low-tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Gleeson et al., 2005 and Buckley 
and Ruane 2006).   
 
Bailey et al., (2009) sum up the situation for the Irish economy during the 1980s 
when they outline that Ireland ultimately faced a ‘crisis’ in the 1980s in no small way 
attributed to the fact that the Irish government had embarked on deficit financed 
expenditure programmes following the oil price rises of the early 1970s and early 
1980s.  MNEs responded to the crisis by not only chopping investment but also 
repatriating profits (note that it is the same story as today), both of which contributed 
to a deficit in the balance of payments amounting to approximately 10% of GNP.  The 
industrial development strategy that prevailed was criticised for its failure to support 
indigenous industry.  The key industrial policy statement of the 1980s strongly 
criticised this industrial development strategy.  The Telesis Report (1982) outlined 
that “Successful indigenously-owned industry is in the long run essential for a high 
income economy…” (p. 185).   
 
 
Period: 1990s and the dawn of the new millennium and onwards 
As outlined previously, the food, beverages and electrical and optical equipment 
industries dominated employment in manufacturing for the 20 year period 1970-1990.  
Employing data from the EUKLEMS data base on the number of persons engaged in 
manufacturing sectors in Ireland over the period 1990-2005 9  provides some 
interesting insights.  The number of persons engaged in the food, beverages industry 
declined from a peak of 23 per cent in 1990 to 20 per cent in 2005.  What is also 
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Source: ILO Unemployment and Participation Rates (1988-1997), Central Statistics Office, Ireland.   
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 Most recent years for which data is available. 
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interesting is the decline in the textile sector from 11 per cent in 1990 to a mere 3 per 
cent in 2005.  Increases in persons engaged in the Chemicals and electrical and optical 
equipment sectors were also witnessed over the 1990-2005 time period.  More 
specifically, the numbers of persons engaged in the chemicals sector increased from 7 
per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2005.  Likewise, the number of persons engaged in 
the electrical and optical equipment sector (NACE DL) increased from a figure of 16 
per cent in 1990 to 23 per cent in 2005 (reaching a peak of 25% in 2000).   
 
One of the major industrial occurrences of the 1990s was the arrival of Dell Computer 
Corporation to Ireland.  Its arrival built on Ireland’s expertise in manufacturing and 
the company also moved into supply-chain management, opened call centres and 
localised newly released software products for European markets. In the same sector, 
the 1990s also witnessed the scaling down of Apple Computers manufacturing 
operation to 15 per cent of facility activity; this however, was replaced by Apple’s 
main European and software development support centre.  Following the initial 
setting up of a manufacturing plant by Intel corporation in 1989 this was followed by 
the establishment of two semiconductor plants in the 1990s (i.e 1994 and 1997).  The 
1990s also witnessed the beginnings of a significant number of small indigenous 
software companies which were in many cases spinoffs from MNE companies. Other 
key MNEs located in the medical devices sector such as for example Boston 
Scientific Corporation and Guidant Corporation, both of which also added critical 
mass to this particular sector.   
 
In our view, the most significant industrial policy document was published in 199210.  
Entitled the ‘Culliton Report’ (1992), through a critical lens it appraised the situation 
that prevailed at the time regarding industrial development in Ireland.  The overriding 
message from the ‘Culliton Report’ was the need for the adoption by government of a 
more ‘holistic’ approach to industrial development and policy.  The Culliton report 
pointed out the serious dichotomy that existed between indigenous and foreign-owned 
firms highlighting that unfortunately, there was little connection between the two. It 
also expressed concerns about the branch plant nature of MNE activity in Ireland.   
 
As outlined by Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan (2006), despite the fact that even 
as far back as 1979, some 95% of all manufacturing units could be classified as 
SMEs, the first formal policy document by the Irish government on the small firm 
sector per se did not emerge until 1994 with the publication of the ‘Task Force on 
Small Business Report’.  Given that most SMEs in Ireland are indigenous firms11, one 
can reasonably argue that the Irish government to a considerable degree overlooked 
the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s.   
More recently, there has been a strong recognition in industrial/enterprise policy 
statements regarding the importance of having a thriving SME/Indigenous base of 
firms.  This is evidenced for example, by the ‘Report of the Small Business Forum’ 
(2006) that acknowledged that as more low-value-added activities move to lower-cost 
economies an increased proportion of GNP will have to be produced by indigenous 
firms (predominately SMEs). One of the most recent policy statements from the Irish 
                                                 
10
 As we have argued elsewhere (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006) the reason for the 
significance of the Cullliton Report is that it placed an emphasis on the overall competitive business 
environment in which firms operate to the forefront.   
11
 Data from 2004-2006 for example, shows that 89-90% of SME enterprises in Ireland are classified as 
Irish firms –CSO.   
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government relating to industrial/enterprise policy is entitled “Building Ireland’s 
Smart Economy” (Government of Ireland, 2008) also recognised upfront the need for 
indigenous firms and entrepreneurship.   
 
The beginning of the new millennium saw some new entrants in software 
development; the e-business sector and bio-pharmaceutical with some of these 
choosing to locate European and R&D activities in Ireland.  Some high profile 
examples included Google (in December 2003, it opened its first overseas office with 
its European headquarters located in Dublin); e-Bay inc and Genzyme Corporation.  
In the pharmaceutical industry many of the world’s most high profile companies have 
firms located in Ireland including such iconic names as Pfizer; Glaxo SmithKline and 
Johnson & Johnson 
 
The new language in policy statements was all about issues such as business 
networking; promoting entrepreneurship; innovation and R&D and from the mid 
2000s onwards as highlighted by for example, the report from the Enterprise Strategy 
Group (ESG) (2004), for policymakers it was all about strengthening Irish 
competitiveness by promoting a knowledge-driven economy. Growth rates of over 8 
per cent prevailed in the late 1990s in Ireland.  It is interesting to note that, despite a 
small R&D catching-up, high growth in Ireland was achieved without major inroads 
into innovation. According to data from EUROSTAT, the number of patent 
applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) by priority year12 shows that for the 
general manufacturing category (NACE D), the number of patent applications in the 
case of Sweden has for every year been significantly higher than in the case of Ireland 
(for example, 97 against 1 in 1977;  917 versus 60 in 1987; and 1,403 versus 144 in 
2006).  
 
In summary therefore, the Irish industrial policy approach can be summed up as one 
that in our view placed too much emphasis on FDI without recognising its limitations.  
Although FDI was a key contributor to the phenomenal growth rates during the late 
1990s-2007 period (Gray 1997), we do argue that the overriding omnipresence of FDI 
in official policy discourse led to the neglect of the indigenous SME sector.  In fact, 
Anyadike-Danes at al (2010) make a related point when they argue that this 
preoccupation with the role of FDI may help to cast light on the connected issue as to 
why entrepreneurship does not appear in mainstream analysis and discussion 
regarding the factors that have brought about Ireland’s economic growth.   
 
3.2. Industrial development activity and policy in Sweden  
 
From the industrial take-off to the 1960s 
 
In terms of industrial development, Sweden is considered as being a slow starter, for 
its today’s well-known industries and companies emerged and took off only in the 
1870s.13 At the time, the emergence of a Swedish industrial base was favoured by a 
                                                 
12
 EUROSTAT, Science and Technology Database, Patent Statistics (pat_ep_nnac). Priority year is the 
first year of filing a patent application to protect an invention.   
13
 The list of Sweden’s current top 15 major companies are: ABB (merger with a Swiss company); 
Astra Zeneca (Pharma) (UK headquarters); R&D headquarters in Sweden, manufactures in 20 
countries and has major research centres in 5. It employs over 54,000 people; Electrolux (electrical 
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large supply of natural resources - i.e. forests and minerals – as well as by a buoyant 
demand in Europe. Cheap electricity – due to the abundance of rivers and waterfalls - 
made Swedish products relatively competitive on the international (and European) 
market. An important infrastructural investment (in transport), as well as a rising 
labour force, were other factors that explained the Swedish industrial take-off. At the 
end of the 19th century, the joint stock company featured increasingly as a new type of 
company, and this was to become the dominating form of ownership in late 19th 
century Swedish industry. This was also the time when large, vertically integrated and 
export oriented company groups began to form. Investment in innovation in 
machinery products allowed the emergence of a small number of engineering 
companies such as Ericsson and ASEA. To bypass the resurgence of protectionism in 
late 19th century Europe, subsidiaries of Swedish firms were founded abroad.  
 
These elements explain the unfolding broad anatomy of Swedish production over 
these critical decades of industrial take-off and development: the extraction and 
processing of raw materials allowed the country to specialise in mechanical 
engineering technologies; major innovations in machinery products were intimately 
connected with export activities (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993). The share of 
engineering exports in total exports rose from 3 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 
1950, one of the highest in the world after the USA (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993).    
The mechanical engineering base was subsequently widened to include electro-
mechanical technologies.  
A direct consequence of this well-developed manufacturing base was a substantial 
increase in economic welfare and standards of living of the population during the 
1950s and 1960s. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s: decades of uncertainty 
 
Like most European countries, Sweden was sharply affected by the oil shocks of the 
1970s. The economic crisis opened the door to an ‘offensive’ industrial policy 
focusing on state ownership and public support to industries, including those in sunset 
areas such as textiles and shipbuilding (Benner, 1997). In spite of its many limitations, 
this ‘offensive’ industrial policy led to some important institutional developments: a 
Swedish Board for Technical Development – which was to become NUTEK – was 
created, and a number of public-private projects geared to the development of new 
technologies in nuclear energy, telecommunications and military aircraft areas were 
initiated (Benner, 1997). 
These two decades were nevertheless marked by a certain degree of uncertainty in 
terms of industrial direction. Up to the 1990s, the country was becoming increasingly 
specialised in low growth industries, to the detriment of more knowledge-intensive 
(high-tech and R&D intensive) industries. As documented by Edquist and Texier  
                                                                                                                                            
appliances – 82,000 employees); Ericsson (telecomm equipment – 64,000 employees); Hasselblad 
(precision equipment – cameras); IKEA (furniture); Kinnevik Group (holding company mainly 
controlling enterprises in the media and telecommunications areas); Pfizer (US group; 
pharmaceutical); Saab-Scania and Saab Automobile (transport equipment; military equipment); SAS 
(Scandinavian Airline System) (partnership with Denmark and Norway); SCA (paper, hypiene 
paper/toiletries); SKF (ballbearings: transport); Telia AB (telecommunication services); Tetra Laval 
(packaging); Volvo (transport) 
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(1996), the proportion of production in R&D intensive growth industries declined 
between 1975 and 1991.  
 
The 1990s: EU membership and a new take-off 
 
By acceding to the EU in 1995, Sweden was able to implement a new strategy of 
exploiting the economies of scale offered by the large EU market. The latter part of 
this decade was marked by a number of post-financial crisis positive changes 
perceptible in the production fabric of the country. In particular, Sweden was able to 
reverse the previous trends of non-optimal export specialisation by increasing its 
export share in high-technology and high-demand manufacturing products. In 
particular, Sweden’s remarkable performance in telecommunication equipment and 
pharmaceutical products improved substantially the country’s ranking as a high-
technology world exporter (Braunerhjelm and Thulin, 2004).    
 
Although initiated as early as in the 1970s, when numbers employed in sunset 
industries (textile and leather) plummeted while the number of people employed in 
the services sector increased (Figure 7), structural change accelerated in the Swedish 
manufacturing sector during the 1990s, with an impressive growth of gross value 
added in telecommunication equipment (NACE DL32) and chemicals (NACE DG, 
table 4).  
 
 
Figure 7: Gross output at current basis prices (Sweden, 1970-2007, per cent of total 
gross output) 
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Source: EU KLEMS Database, Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research and the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, the Netherlands. 
 
 
Table 4: Gross value added at current basic prices in manufacturing industries 
(Sweden, selected years, 1970-2007, %) 
Year  1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 
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Total   100 100 100 100 100 
NACE Industry      
DA Food products, 
beverages and tobacco, 
of which 
n/a 6.60 8.52 7.78 7.91 
DB Manufacture of 
textiles and textile 
products 
n/a 2.43 1.51 1.06 0.84** 
DC  Manufacture of leather 
and leather products n/a 0.34 0.21 0.11 n/a 
DD  Manufacture of wood 
and wood products n/a 6.06 5.42 3.53 5.10 
DE Manufacture of pulp 
and paper products n/a 14.67 14.86 15.71 10.74 
DF  Manufacture of coke, 
refined petroleum 
products 
n/a 0.81 0.88 1.01 0.94 
DG  Manufacture of 
chemicals, chemical 
products and man-
made fibres 
n/a 8.30 8.99 11.04 11.13 
DH  Manufacture of rubber 
and plastic products n/a 2.10 2.28 2.95 2.98 
DI  Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
products 
n/a 2.96 2.97 1.96 2.18 
DJ Manufacture of basic 
metals and fabricated 
metal products 
 
n/a 16.54 13.82 13.69 17.10 
DK  Manufacture of 
machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
n/a 12.68 12.88 11.78 13.56 
DL Manufacture of 
electrical and optical 
equipment 
n/a 11.92 12.11 12.04 12.70 
 30 Office machinery 
and computers n/a 0.93 0.94 0.52 n/a 
 31 Electrical 
machinery and  n/a 3.32 3.37 3.15 n/a 
 32 Radio, television 
apparatus n/a 3.93 3.99 5.33 n/a 
 33 Medical, precision 
instruments n/a 3.75 3.80 3.06 n/a 
DM Manufacture of 
transport equipment n/a 13.36 13.57 14.49 12.24 
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. n/a 1.23 2.01 2.84 2.57 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research and the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, the Netherlands. 
** DB+DC 
 18 
 
As shown in table 4, the broad engineering sector represents today nearly 40 per cent 
of the total manufacturing VA, manufacturing employment and total exports (the 
latter two not reported in the table). This sector contributes 29 per cent of Swedish 
GDP. This sector has been and still is the main manufacturing sector in Sweden. It has 
a high technological level and it encompasses highly innovating large Swedish firms 
with a world dimension. This is the case for ASTRA and Pharmacia & Upjohn in the 
chemical industry, for SKF, the world producer of ball bearings, for ABB who 
dominates three areas (power generation, power transmission and distribution area 
and robotics), as well as for Volvo and SAAB in the transport industry. Over time, 
some of the firms have seized the evolving opportunities by capitalising and 
diversifying in sun rise industries; this is the case for Ericson that moved from 
mechanical engineering into electronics. The table shows that the structure of 
production has been fairly stable over time, in that the engineering sector has been an 
important actor of industrial growth after WWII; structural change can nevertheless 
be seen in the case of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a growing industry over time. 
 
The contemporary period: the dawn of the new millennium and onwards 
 
With the advent of the new millennium, a number of changes were introduced in the 
organisation of Swedish innovation policy with for example the split of NUTEK into 
two components (NUTEK and The Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems - 
VINNOVA). In the eyes of some authors, this made Swedish policy become an 
innovation as opposed to merely an industrial policy (Bitard et al., 2008). Also, the 
1980s initiatives in terms of venture capital were strongly consolidated by numerous 
government schemes aimed at providing seed and early stage financing for innovating 
firms. Consolidation and expansion equally took place in the area of the dissemination 
and commercialization of university-based research. This emphasis on home grown 
and domestically commercialised research brings a response to the ‘Swedish 
Innovation Paradox’, according to which high R&D intensity in Sweden is not 
matched by a high share of high-tech (R&D intensive) products in manufacturing 
(Edquist and McKelvey, 1998; Bitard et al., 2008).  
 
As can be seen from a brief summary of Swedish industrial take-off, development and 
refinement, the success of Swedish manufacturing firms, in particular of Swedish 
MNEs abroad, is to a large extent attributable to the country’s long tradition of a high 
Governmental involvement at all levels of industrial affairs. Although state aids in the 
1970s14 resulted in a sub-optimal allocation of resources, the policy of the 1980s 
started being redeployed towards forward looking measures. As a result, large efforts 
were made in favour of innovation, of the introduction of new technologies across 
industries and fostering SMEs, in stimulating exports as well as a regional balance. 
With regard to SMEs, the changes that started to emerge with the 1983 tax code and 
with other tax reforms in 1990 put an end to an industrial policy which was seen as 
being biased against smaller and less capital-intensive firms. As argued by Davis and 
Herenkson (1995), the biased tax system before 1990 has resulted in a productive 
                                                 
14
 Sweden postponed the downturn caused by the oil shock through an expansionary fiscal policy; as a 
result, employment rates were maintained, but wage inflation led to dwindling export shares, 
particularly in the years 1974-76. 
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structure characterised by a low rate of self employment and dominant large firms 
leading to a highly concentrated ownership and control.  
With a small number of exceptions, Swedish industrial policy has normally been 
successful in turning threats into opportunities. For example, following the October 
1982 devaluation of the Krone, a Special Investment Fund was created whereby 
companies had to deposit 20 per cent of their pre-tax profit into the fund managed by 
the Central Bank; monies could then be used for investment purposes. This has 
resulted in high productivity growth rates.  
 
In summary, the MNE/indigenous dichotomy does exist in Sweden too, although it is 
not one that opposes large (efficient) firms on the one hand and small (less efficient) 
firms on the other. In Sweden, foreign firms are evenly distributed across 
manufacturing and services and indigenous firms control the highly export oriented 
and technology-based engineering sector. Swedish Government policy has 
encouraged the export of innovation-driven export manufacturing activities and SME 
development, particularly in latter years. 
 
 
 
Section 4: The nationality (indigenous versus foreign) issue: does it 
matter? 
 
Below we explore the issue as to whether firm ownership/nationality provides some 
insights into explaining the details of the trends behind the performance of the 
manufacturing sector in Ireland  and Sweden over various decades.   
 
4.1. The case of Ireland  
 
As evident from Table 5, Employment in Irish firms is dominated by the more 
traditional sectors of food products and beverages; textiles and clothing; wood; paper 
products, publishing and printing.  The ‘complex’ economy sectors are dominated by 
employment in foreign-owned firms. For example, the chemicals and chemical 
product sector is very much dominated by employment in foreign firms (80 per cent 
of those employed in this sector). This is also the case for the office machine and 
computers and electrical machinery sector.  Likewise the motor vehicles & trailers 
and other transport equipment sector has also become increasingly dominated by 
employment in foreign-owned firms. A more even distribution of nationality of 
ownership occurs in the case of the machinery and equipment sector.  In contrast, 
CSO figures show that Irish firms completely dominate employment across all 
industries of the services sector.    
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Table 5: Indicators of manufacturing enterprises in Ireland classified by nationality of ownership (1998-2006) 
 
 
 
Persons engaged in 
manufacturing 
enterprises (% per  
industry) 
Turnover(% of total 
value in each industry) 
Labour costs Labour productivity Exports 
NACE 
Rev. 
1.1 
Industries 
Nationality 
of 
ownership 
1998 2002 2006 1998 2002 2006 1998 2002 2006 1998 2002 2006 1998 2002 2006 
Irish 75.1 75.8 78.5 52.8 51.2 45.2 64.4 65.3 64.7 36.0 48.0 68.8 42.7 37.7 26.2 15-16 Manufacture of food products; beverages 
and tobacco Foreign 24.9 24.2 21.5 47.2 48.8 54.8 35.6 34.7 35.3 273.1 426.7 517.7 57.3 62.3 73.8 
Irish 60.8 67.2 68.3 51.2 55.4 59.2 54.9 59.0 63.4 21.4 26.1 n/a 36.4 42.5 41.6 17-18 Manufacture of textiles and textile products Foreign 39.2 32.8 31.7 48.8 44.6 40.8 45.1 41.0 36.6 38.5 49.6 n/a 63.6 57.5 58.4 
Irish 79.4 83.5 n/a 64.5 73.2 n/a 67.8 74.0 n/a 26.6 43.9 n/a 22.1 24.2 n/a 20 Manufacture of wood and wood products Foreign 20.6 16.5 n/a 35.5 26.8 n/a 32.2 26.0 n/a 65.4 77.1 n/a 77.9 75.8 n/a 
Irish 71.8 66.1 72.8 24.7 16.5 18.2 70.8 60.4 64.2 47.7 52.9 67.0 4.4 2.0 4.6 21-22 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing Foreign 28.2 33.9 27.2 75.3 83.5 81.8 29.2 39.6 35.8 179.3 313.6 499.7 95.6 98.0 95.4 
Irish 20.0 16.9 20.5 5.1 2.8 4.1 16.8 12.6 14.3 55.3 50.8 62.2 1.6 1.0 1.8 24 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres Foreign 80.0 83.1 79.5 94.9 97.2 95.9 83.2 87.4 85.7 466.2 785.7 601.1 98.4 99.0 98.2 
Irish 55.9 64.4 67.7 50.8 58.9 64.6 51.2 60.3 63.1 34.2 43.1 53.6 29.6 31.7 43.6 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Foreign 44.1 35.6 32.3 49.2 41.1 35.4 48.8 39.7 36.9 53.6 51.4 63.3 70.4 68.3 56.4 
Irish 83.7 83.5 85.8 82.2 78.9 77.5 81.7 80.2 81.0 55.7 61.1 87.7 63.7 59.2 74.6 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Foreign 16.3 16.5 14.2 17.8 21.1 22.5 18.3 19.8 19.0 61.5 78.3 150.3 36.3 40.8 25.4 
Irish 73.4 78.2 84.6 62.2 68.2 74.6 64.9 71.7 78.1 32.6 37.5 53.0 33.6 31.3 35.8 27-28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated 
metal products Foreign 26.6 21.8 15.4 37.8 31.8 25.4 35.1 28.3 21.9 51.5 59.8 65.2 66.4 68.7 64.2 
Irish 52.6 54.1 54.0 43.1 41.3 41.1 47.6 46.1 47.3 32.4 40.0 57.7 25.7 23.8 25.7 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. Foreign 47.4 45.9 46.0 56.9 58.7 58.9 52.4 53.9 52.7 55.7 65.9 113.7 74.3 76.2 74.3 
Irish 19.3 16.7 13.2 7.9 4.4 3.4 14.9 13.7 11.4 32.7 44.7 64.5 4.8 2.7 2.1 30-33 Manufacture of electrical and optical 
equipment Foreign 80.7 83.3 86.8 92.1 95.6 96.6 85.1 86.3 88.6 74.5 128.9 152.0 95.2 97.3 97.9 
Irish 53.6 27.3 22.9 38.7 25.7 25.6 52.4 21.2 18.2 36.2 37.7 48.2 23.9 14.7 12.4 34-35 Manufacture of transport equipment Foreign 46.4 72.7 77.1 61.3 74.3 74.4 47.6 78.8 81.8 54.4 49.5 58.6 76.1 85.3 87.6 
Irish 67.9 71.3 74.5 57.2 69.2 27.0 60.6 62.5 62.9 36.9 61.9 53.0 40.4 37.8 22.6 36-
37,19,
23 
Manufacture of leather products, refined 
petroleum products and n.e.c., Foreign 32.1 28.7 25.5 42.8 30.8 73.0 39.4 37.5 37.1 54.4 86.3 275.0 59.6 62.2 77.4 
Source: Central Statistics Office Ireland (CSO), Census of Industrial Production (various years). 
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Table 5 shows also that turnover is marginally dominated by Irish firms in the case of the more traditional manufacturing sectors of food 
products and beverages; textiles and clothing and wood (except furniture).  Interestingly the opposite is the case for pulp, paper, paper products, 
publishing and printing.  As expected turnover in the case of chemicals and chemical products is decisively dominated by foreign-owned firms; 
this is also the case for the manufacture of machinery and equipment along with office machinery & computers and electrical machinery.  
Finally, the same holds for the manufacture of motor vehicles & trailers and other transport equipment.   
 
On average, labour costs in Irish owned firms are higher than those in foreign owned firms.  More specifically, looking at table 5, we can see that 
in the case of the more traditional sectors of food products, beverages, textiles and clothing labour costs in Irish firms are higher and have indeed 
increased overtime.  Labour costs in foreign firms tend to be higher in the case of chemicals and chemical products and office machinery & 
computers and electrical machinery.   
 
What is immediately striking from table 5 is the fact that labour productivity in foreign firms is higher than in Irish firms across all sectors (even 
in those where Irish firms dominate).  For example, labour productivity even in the most traditional sector of food products, beverages, textiles 
and clothing is almost 8 times higher in foreign owned firms when compared to Irish-owned firms in the same sector.  Looking at the opposite 
end of the spectrum (chemicals sector), that is, a sector where foreign firms dominate we see yet again that even in 1998 foreign firms in this 
sector were 8 times more productive in terms of labour productivity compared to their Irish-owned counterparts; this increases to almost 10 
times in 2006 (most recent year for which data is available). The largest differential in the chemical sector occurs in 2002 when labour 
productivity in foreign owned firms is almost 16 times higher than that which prevailed in the case of Irish firms.   
 
Finally, exports in manufacturing enterprises classified by nationality of ownership over the period 1998-2006 (per cent of total value in each 
industry) are also presented in table 5. In all sectors over all years foreign-owned enterprises export more than their indigenous Irish firm 
counterparts (except in the case of the non-metallic mineral products sector where the percentage of exports by Irish firms is higher).   
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4.2. The nationality issue in Swedish industry  
As of December 2008, there were 12,861 foreign controlled enterprises in Sweden, 
representing a total of 621,721 employees, or approximately 15 per cent of total 
employment in the country.15 Of these 12,861 foreign controlled firms, some 75 per 
cent are in the services sector. As shown in figure 1 below the share of total 
employment in foreign controlled firms has increased over time, particularly since the 
entry of Sweden in the EU in 1995. In 2006, this share represented less than a quarter 
of employment in the business (or private) sector. 
 
 
Source: Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (2007) Official Statistics of Sweden, S2007-005, 
‘Foreign Controlled Enterprises 2006’, Stockholm, p. 9. 
 
By broad sector, a third of all manufacturing jobs and 20 per cent of all jobs in the 
services sector respectively are in foreign firms. With regard to the distribution of 
employment between the indigenous versus foreign firms, and across the different 
industries in the manufacturing and services sectors, figure 4 shows that six industries 
are dominated by foreign firms. These are the chemical industry (where 84 per cent of 
total employment is in foreign firms), coke (79 per cent), air transport (70 per cent), 
and other non-metallic products (64 per cent). At a more refined level of analysis, 
electrical machinery (56 per cent) and motor vehicles (51 per cent) are also 
characterised by relatively high levels of employment in foreign firms. 
 
However, the engineering sector (NACE 28-35, comprising in particular motor 
vehicles and electrical machinery) is mostly controlled by Swedish firms. Only a third 
of all employment in this industry group, a relatively large employer, is in foreign 
controlled firms (table 6). This implies that, in spite of globalisation and of the entry 
of Sweden in the EU in 1995, Swedish firms still control the majority of employment 
in critical or high tech industries. In the case of Ireland, a reverse scenario was 
                                                 
15
 The definition of a foreign controlled enterprise is the one used by the OECD and the EU. An 
enterprise is defined as being foreign controlled, if more than 50 per cent of the voting rights are 
controlled by foreign institutional units.   
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observed. As hinted at above, the industries in this group category are also export 
oriented. According to Swedish official data, the motor vehicles and machinery & 
equipment (Swedish controlled) industries represented 18.1 per cent and 16.8 per cent 
respectively of all manufacturing exports in 2007. They are also the leading industries 
in terms of labour productivity; this is particularly the case for electrical and optical 
equipment, a very much indigenous industry, which boasts the highest labour 
productivity rate over the last years. 
 
 
 
Source: Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (2007) Official Statistics of Sweden, S2007-
005, ‘Foreign Controlled Enterprises 2006’, Stockholm, p.14. 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Employment in foreign controlled enterprises as a percentage of total 
employment by industry (selected industries, 2006) 
 Number of 
foreign 
Number of 
employees in 
Share of employees in 
foreign firms as a % of 
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enterprises foreign firms employment per 
industry 
Services (50-99) 8,393 314,415 20 
Manufacturing       
         of which: 
Chemicals (24) 
Computers (30) 
Electrical Mach (31) 
Radio, TV (32) 
Medical Equipment (33) 
Motor Vehicle (34) 
Other Transport (35) 
1,597 
 
135 
9 
68 
64 
81 
73 
46 
232,530 
 
30,885 
559 
13,373 
4,384 
7,005 
39,161 
5,834 
35 
 
84 
16 
56 
17 
37 
51 
26 
TOTAL 11,107 572,715 23 
Source: Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (2007) Official Statistics of Sweden, S2007-005, 
‘Foreign Controlled Enterprises 2006’, Stockholm, pp.25-26 
 
 
In terms of size, most of the foreign controlled enterprises (87 per cent) were small 
with fewer than 50 employees in 2008. These small enterprises accounted however 
for only 12 per cent of employees in foreign controlled enterprises. By contrast, large 
foreign enterprises (with 250 or more employees) accounted for 4 per cent of all 
foreign controlled enterprises, but for 67 per cent of all employees in foreign 
controlled enterprises. Smaller foreign controlled enterprises tend to be more present 
in the services sector whereas employment in foreign controlled large firms tends to 
be more evenly distributed between manufacturing industry and the service sector. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Irish situation where foreign firms tend to be larger 
than their indigenous counterparts in the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
 
As seen above, job losses have been a direct and immediate consequence of the 
current economic crisis so far. In 2009, the manufacturing sector lost 65,000 jobs (a 9 
per cent contraction), whereas employement within the construction industry 
decreased by 19,000 persons (a 6.8 per cent decrease) (Statistics Sweden, 2009). 
Inevitably, the contraction of investment and consumption on world markets has been 
hiting the export oriented firms in Sweden; SAAB has been sheding 750 jobs in 
March 2009, whereas Skania and Volvo announced job cuts. The Swedish Statistics 
Office nevertheless forecast a 10 per cent increase in the number of people employed 
in the manufacturing sector in 2010, whereas employment in the construction sector is 
still set to contract (by another 6.9 per cent). Consequently, there seems to be a 
rebound of economic growth (as seen in table 1) paralled with the resuming of exports 
from the key, and mostly Swedish dominated, engineering sector. 
 
Section 5. Conclusions 
Both Ireland and Sweden have been greatly affected by the recent global economic 
shock, albeit in rather different ways (asymmetric shocks). Although estimates and 
forecasts denote a rebound of economic growth in Sweden for 2010, the Irish 
economy seems to be entangled in the grips of a lasting negative growth. The key 
question posed in the current paper is the following: why is the economy of Ireland 
impacted upon more than that of a similar sized economy, namely Sweden? Does the 
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comparative analysis of the structure of production, and in particular of the 
manufacturing sector provide any insights?  
 
The growth in the unemployment rate has been unprecedented in Ireland, with, so far, 
most of the job losses affecting the construction sector. Growth emanating from asset 
price inflation, spurred on by a combination of low interest rates, reckless lending and 
speculation has been proven as a poor foundation for sustainable growth in Ireland. 
The incommensurable challenge for Ireland at this juncture is to compensate the 
contraction of the cyclically-based construction sector with job increases in both 
manufacturing and services. The critical analysis proposed in this paper, which rests 
on a comparative examination of Ireland’s industrial structure over a long period, 
assesses the chances of this adjustment to occur. This may all depend on the ‘quality’ 
of Ireland’s productive structure, on its sustainability. 
 
Starting with competitiveness issues, although we do agree that (price) 
competitiveness does matter to some extent, insights from the current paper highlight 
however that a high cost economy such as Sweden can still have a more ‘sustainable’ 
growth rate than that of an economy such as Ireland. This is due to the benefits that 
emerge from an economy which has adopted a more balanced approach in terms of 
firm ownership, and due to an industrial policy which placed innovative indigenous 
firms as a cornerstone of its industrial strategy. The Swedish strategy led to the 
establishment and growth of large Swedish firms in the growing engineering sector, to 
the assistance of industries in decline through redeployment of displaced workers 
away from traditional lower value-added activities towards more complex industries 
in higher value added activities and to a relatively strong focus on SMEs and 
stimulating exports.   
 
As a result of these different paths in terms of industrial policy, our comparative 
analysis leads to the following findings: (i) the MNE/indigenous dichotomy does exist 
in both countries indeed, but in Sweden it is not reducible to a large (efficient) firms/ 
small (less efficient) firms dichotomy. (ii) In Ireland, foreign firms are highly 
concentrated in large and high-tech manufacturing activities, whereas in Sweden they 
are more evenly distributed across manufacturing and services. (iii) Foreign firms 
represent 15% of total employment in Sweden whereas foreign firms (mostly US-
owned) control high technology manufacturing activities in Ireland. By contrast, 
indigenous firms control the highly export oriented and technology-based engineering 
sector in Sweden. Consequently, the US-dominated ‘complex’ manufacturing sector 
in Ireland, combined with the current disarray experienced by the US economy do not 
augur too well in terms of allowing manufacturing activities to take over from the 
building sector in Ireland. This should be contrasted to the resilience of the Swedish 
economy which, when compared with Ireland, seems to be linked to its ability to 
‘master’ its own destiny.  
 
The overall answer that begins to emerge from the preliminary analysis is that 
economic sovereignty may play a role-defined for the purpose of this paper as the 
relative importance of indigenous firms in the manufacturing industry in a particular 
economy. The implication is that economies which place a greater emphasis on an 
indigenous industrial development strategy increase their probability of being less 
vulnerable (due to increased independence) to shocks which affect their industrial 
manufacturing sector. Indigenous firms are likely to be more embedded into 
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local/regional economies and are less likely to be as footloose as MNEs when the 
going gets tough. When growth resumes, it is likely that positive adjustments will be 
easier and quicker in the case of Sweden (where an expansion of production can be 
instantaneous, thanks to a quality indigenous industrial/manufacturing base), than in 
Ireland, where such expansion primarily depends on inward FDI. 
 
Policy implications are therefore clear: adopting a more balanced approach (in terms 
of the mix between indigenous and foreign firm ownership); promoting structural 
change in indigenous firms (as in the Swedish case); promoting entrepreneurship and 
innovation (which has nevertheless been making progress from a relatively low base) 
are key strategies for Ireland’s future. On a more general level, we would argue that 
the poor evaluation culture in Ireland (as argued by Lenihan (1999; 2004); Lenihan et 
al (2005) and Lenihan and Hart (2004)) did not help the Irish government to see the 
‘error’ of its ways earlier.  We would go so far as to argue that if on-going thorough 
evaluation at both the micro (firm) and macro levels had been an inherent part of the 
industrial policy process, this imbalance of focus by policymakers on indigenous 
versus MNE firms would in all likelihood have been recognised earlier.   
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